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The European Union and the Eurozone: The Danger that Lay Ahead 
 
María Lorca-Susino
 
 
The past two years have been very dramatic for the EU, particularly for the Eurozone. Not only have the 
financial and economic crises impacted every single country but, most importantly, southern European 
countries have developed problems of their own, which are affecting the entire system worldwide. 
In  2010  a  sovereign  debt  problem  unfolded  in  Greece.  However,  solving  this  problem  and 
avoiding contagion to other countries and areas of the world has proven to be quite a challenge.  March 
2011  was  a  decisive  month  for  both  the  EU  and  the  Eurozone  because two  dramatic  but  necessary 
financial and economic agreements took place.  The first one was the agreement to reinforce the Stability 
and Growth Pact by automatically implementing harsher financial sanctions for rule breakers. The second 
was to finally agree, after two years of debate, on establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).   
This  deal  was  sealed  among  European  Finance  Ministers  to  approve  a  detailed  agreement 
establishing a permanent crisis mechanism, which was designed on November 28, 2010, following a 
proposal by the European Commission and agreed to by the euro area Ministers of Finance. The purpose 
of this mechanism is to safeguard financial stability in the euro area by expanding the mandate of the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). The EMS is ready to lend around €500bn, or about $710bn 
to troubled Eurozone countries; however, this amount does not seem to be enough to support Eurozone 
member states in difficulties.  The ESM will start operating in 2013 to replace the current EFSF. The 
ESM has been created with the intention to prevent and end any future sovereign-debt crisis, the reason 
being that after Greece received the rescue package in May 2010, it was thought that the area was saved 
and that it was business as usual; however, the situation in Greece has not improved, and other countries 
have shown the need for economic support.  
This paper summarizes the Greek situation by analyzing the two rescue plans in order to help the 
country avoid default, and also seeks to open the debate on whether Eurozone member states such as 
Greece should be left to its own devices and default on its sovereign debt; thus, this work briefly reviews 
and compares default cases such as Asia and Argentina. Also, it aims at shedding light on the actions that 
have been taken to save the rest of the euro area countries in difficulties and pinpoints that the measures 
taken are not enough to settle the financial markets. After two years of crisis and panic, it is clear that the 
instability  in  the  Eurozone  will  only  disappear  with  the  introduction  of  a  Eurobond;  however,  this 
financial requisite requires fiscal unity, which is the one integration step that is clearly not accepted by 
Eurozone governments as of summer 2011. Finally, this paper highlights the role of the banking system in 
underpinning the stability of the European Union in order to bring stability and trust to the union.  
This paper concludes that the EU faces a make or break moment in summer 2011. The efforts to 
save Greece and other countries in difficult situations are not working. The current course of action is 
demonstrating that the European Union and the euro may not be saved for a number of reasons. Firstly, a 
financial  crisis  is  being  worked  out  by  politicians  representing  different  sovereign  countries.  These 
politicians are therefore defending their national interests; that is, their tax payers’ money.  Secondly, the 
EFSF, worth €440bn, is simply not enough to cover both the existing and expected financial necessities. 
Unless  it  is  agreed  that  this  fund  enjoys  a  safety  net  of  a  few  trillion  euros  to  rescue  countries  in 
difficulties, the markets are not going to calm down. Also, there should be a fiscal union and a European 
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bond, which is an option that is not accepted by some EU member states. Still, European politicians 
believe that the European Central Bank should follow the Federal Reserve Bank’s footsteps. However, the 
Fed is the central bank of a fiscally unified country, the ECB is not. Thus, politicians should understand 
that the European Central Bank has a limited ―obligation‖ to help those countries in difficulties.  
 
Understanding the Greek Conundrum: Two Rescue Plans and One Mission  
 
In May 2010 Greece publicly announced to the world that it was on the brick of bankruptcy with a 
country debt expected to reach about €350bn by 2014.
2  The world, and most importantly the EU, could 
not afford such a financial disaster because the world is still fighting to survive the crisis of 2007. Thus, it 
was agreed that Greece had to be saved and a bail-out plan was put in place to help Greece under the 
motto: ―save now, ask later.‖   
The reason why Greece performed so poorly is widely known. Greece has not respected the 
Stability and Growth Pact and was never forced to put finances in order and, as a consequence, the SGP 
has been reformed once again with stricter rules and compliance requirements.  Much has been written to 
explain that once upon a time France and Germany did not comply with the SGP and that they were not 
forced to obey; hence, why should Greece be forced to observe the SGP? Although France and Germany 
did not comply, Greece cannot be compared with economic and financial soundness of these countries. 
Greece has technically defaulted on its sovereign debt, while Germany is the strongest country in the 
union and the second biggest exporter in the world.  However, this work could not faithfully explain the 
situation if it did not present another reason that sheds light on the current financial distress. Greece used 
―creative accounting‖
3 to work out the numbers on its national accounts in 2009, which led to the budget 
crisis in 2010. It has been well-documented that in 2008 Greece presented budget deficit estimates for 
2009, which stood at about 6.7% of gross domestic product; however, in October 2008 the newly elected 
Greek government revised the estimate of the government budget deficit for 2009 from 6.7% of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) to 12.7% of GDP‖.
4 It was then explained that Goldman Sachs helped Greece 
―obscure billions in debt from the budget overseers in Brussels.‖
5 
To save Greece, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Euro area nations came up with 
what  was labeled  a  ―lending  facility‖,  or  bailout,  of  €110bn  ($146.2Bn)  on May  2,  2010: €30bn  in 
standby agreement with the IMF and €80bn from euro area member states in the form of bilateral loans, 
once approved in national parliaments.
6 The terms of the bail-out were set as a three year bailout plan that 
Greece would have to repay with an interest of 7.5%. The first loan, worth €30bn, was given before May 
19, 2010, the date by which Greece had to make debt repayment and avoid defaulting on its massive debt. 
However, Greece was also asked to take some extreme austerity measures that would help cut €30bn over 
the next three years, which was expected to help reduce public debt from 13.6% in May 2010 to less than 
3% by 2014.  Some of these austerity measures - scraping bonus payments for public sector workers, 
capping annual holiday bonuses, increasing the Value Added Tax from 21% to 23%, raising taxes on fuel, 
alcohol, and tobacco by 10% and taxing illegal construction
7 - have shaken the social roots of the country 
and have caused social demonstrations and general strikes.  
Despite intentions and actions taken to curve spending, neither investors nor the market believed 
in Greece and, as a result, on February 7, 2011, the country’s Credit Default Swap (CDS) soared to 472.6 
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6 European Commission Economic and Financial Affairs, ―Euro area and IMF agreement on financial support programme for 
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points. At that point, the country witnessed a flight of capital as the market realized that ―default‖ was a 
very real possibility, and investors showed a total lack of confidence in the country. With this scenario, 
Greece had no other option but to see its debt downgraded by the three major rating agencies: On May 7, 
2011, Moody’s downgraded Greece from Ba1 to B1; on May 9, 2011, S&P downgraded Greece from BB- 
to B; finally, Fitch downgraded on May 20, 2011, from BB+ to B+.   
In July 2011, just about twelve months after Greece asked for the first rescue package, more 
money was needed; if Greece were to not get a second rescue package, the world would witness and 
suffer a sovereign default. The problem is that the first rescue plan has not been enough to solve the 
problem because Greece is immersed in a severe economic recession and the situation is such that on June 
1
st, 2011, Moody’s downgraded Greece to Caa1, on par with Cuba, and raised the nation’s risk of default 
to 50%.
8  
The second round of financial help was worth €109bn
9 in new loans and Greece agreed in return 
to implement about €78bn in additional austerity measures and asset sales through 2015.
10 This time, 
however, this rescue plan involved some sacrifice on the bondh olders’ side. In fact, this new rescue 
package includes a target of about €37bn in bondholders’ commitment to either swap or rollover their 
debt for new bonds that mature in 30 years, which would represent a 21 per cent reduction in the bonds’ 
value and ―is expected to trigger a selective default.‖
11   What Papandreou promised in return to the IMF 
and the Eurozone member states to secure this second package was that the government was going to 
implement a €6.4 billion spending cut from June 2011 to December 2011, another €22 billion up to 2015, 
and  €50  billion  in  sales  of  assets.  What  is  mindboggling  is  that  it  was  chosen  to  implement  easier 
adjustments first and hard ones later, which makes it seem as if political actors are postponing the hardest 
cuts for later: €6.4bn in 2011 and €22bn in 2015.  
Greece was still entitled to the last payment of the first bail-out plan when asking for a second 
rescue package. To get this money, Greece had to convince the IMF to agree to grant the final payment of 
the first rescue package.
12 This last tranche consisted of a €12bn payment due on June 29, 2011, out of 
which €3.3bn were coming from the IMF. In order to receive this money, Greece had to agree to further 
cuts: €14.32bn of public spending cuts and €14.09bn of tax increases for 5 years. These extra austerity 
measures are causing much trouble for Greece. Greece must deal with the international market’s lack of 
trust in any of the promised deficit cuts and debt reductions; furthermore, it has to deal with instability 
forces at home from two sources, the first being a tremendous opposition from members of labor unions 
that took over the Finance Ministry offices in central Athens. Unions prevented employees from entering 
buildings and hung a banner from the roof calling for a general strike to oppose the measures.
13 The 
second source of distress comes from the Conservative  party, whose leaders rejected the new austerity 
measures, claiming that these measures would flatten the Greek economy and destroy Greek society.
14  
 
 
 
                                                           
8 Jonathan Stearns and Maria Petrakis, ―EU preparing new rescue plan for Greece,‖ June 4, 2011. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-03/eu-preparing-new-rescue-package-for-greece.html 
9  Peter Spiegel, Quentin Peel, Patrick Jenkins, and Richard Milne, ―Deal on Greece bail-out,‖ Financial Times, Friday 22, 
2011  
10 Natalie Weeks and Marcus Bensasson, ―Papandreou Clinches Votes for Second Greek Budget Bill,‖ Bloomberg, June 30, 
2011. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-30/papandreou-wins-enough-votes-to-pass-greek-budget-bill-ensuring-
bailout.html 
11 Peter Spiegel and Quentin Peel, ―EU leaders agree €109bn Greek bail-out,‖ Financial Times, July 21, 2011.  
12 Andrew Hickley, ―Juncker raises doubts on IMF Greek payment,‖ GFS News, May 27, 2011. 
http://www.gfsnews.com/article/1968/1/ 
13 Jonathan Stearns and Maria Petrakis, ―Greece to Get Next Aid Payment From New Bailout, ― Bloomberg, June 3, 2011. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-03/greece-to-get-next-aid-installment-as-euro-zone-officials-plan-new-
bailout.html 
14 Nick LLiev, ―Greece suffers second round of severe austerity measures,‖ The Sofia Echo, May 30, 2011. 
http://sofiaecho.com/2011/05/30/1097351_greece-faces-second-round-of-severe-austerity-measures 6 
 
 
Greece Is Not Alone: A Fool’s Consolation 
 
Both the market and investors have been waiting for politicians to make a decision over what should be 
done to solve the problem other than throwing money at what can be called the ―Greek black hole‖ to 
avoid default. There have been many options, but the most interesting one has been to implement an 
adjusted version of the ―Brady Plan‖ in Greece. This plan was used by the IMF to bring most Latin 
American countries out of their financial crises. The Brady Plan for Greece was briefly discussed by few 
economists  as  an  option  to  solve  the  crisis  but  never  became  a  valid  scenario,  despite  its  proven 
effectiveness in the Latin American case. However, some form of an ―informal‖ Brady plan seems to be 
operating in the market. 
The assistance that Greece received was aimed at preventing default, but something must be done 
about  Greece’s  debt,  which  is  expected  to  surpass  140%  of  the  GDP  in  2011.  Thus,  the  debate  on 
―defaulting vs. no-defaulting‖ has sparked a debate. One side defends that countries should be left to 
default and self-organize, such as the case of Argentina. Argentina is again making headlines as a miracle, 
since it did not accept any financial help and defaulted in its sovereign debts, making it the biggest default 
in  history  to  date.  Ten  years  later,  Argentina  has  paid  almost  everything.  But  it  has  a  tremendous 
advantage  over  Greece:  Argentina  has  abundant  natural  resources  which  are  being  demanded  by 
developing countries, mainly China. The demand for raw material during the past 2 years has helped the 
country enjoy an impressive expansionary economic momentum and has improved national accounts, 
which would help pay back remaining debts. The other side believes that countries should be helped with 
economic rescue packages conditional to structural reforms and debt restructuring. This was the approach 
used during the Asian crisis in the late 1990s.  However, this has been pejoratively called ―financial 
imperialism.‖ Nonetheless, this new form of imperialism has quite an interesting track record among 
Southeast Asian countries, since most of these countries that were given financial aid and forced to 
restructure are today strong in the international markets.  
The table below summarizes the problem faced during the past sovereign debt crisis, the amount 
of the rescue fund provided and the outcome. In summary, Mexico can be considered the first country 
which had difficulties. Due to its geographical situation, the US immediately decided to provide the 
necessary funding to stop the crisis and control the situation. Thus, when Mexico was at the dawn of 
default the US helped with about $50bn in loans. The East Asian crisis was different. Those countries 
immersed  in  the  Asian  crisis  were  helped  either  by  the  IMF,  the  World  Bank,  G7  countries,  or  a 
combination. When Thailand—the first country in the area—ran into financial difficulties, the US did not 
rush to save it, as the problem in this country was regarded as insignificant. However, the 1997 East 
Asian crisis demonstrated that no problem is small enough and that contagion will become a fact. This 
lack of response on the part of the US has been blamed and used to explain the spillover effect to the rest 
of the area. Years later, Russia ran into sovereign debt difficulties and defaulted selectively after receiving 
some help. 
Most believe that avoiding default is the right path, but then the problem becomes what to do with 
the massive amount of sovereign debt spread worldwide. From the beginning of the Greek crisis, one case 
scenario was ―no restructuring‖ of the Greek debt.  However, this could not be an option because, in order 
for Greece to be able to pull through the current economic situation, there was going to be a need to 
impose some debt restructuring upon private investors. ―Voluntary restructuring‖ was a second option. 
Should Greece take this option, the question would remain whether the restructuring is drastic enough to 
convince the market that the post-Restructuring debt stock would be honorable and serviceable this time 
around.  Finally, a ―forced restructuring‖ was not negotiable, as it was treated by the market and investors 
as a default and a restructuring. However, it seems that the third option is the way to go, since the second 
rescue plan includes involvement on the side of bondholders and investors on Greek sovereign bonds. In 
fact, ―the Institute of International Finance estimated the total reduction in the net present value of Greek 7 
 
debt to be 21 per cent.‖
15 Thus, Greece has defaulted selectively in its debt despite receiving economic 
rescue during the past two years. 
Greece is not alone, the difference being that very few countries have received both financial aid 
and have defaulted. The table below shows the list of countries that were once about to default on their 
sovereign debt and a summary of the rescue package provided by international institutions. In the case of 
Southeast Asia, it is important to mention that a total of $116bn left the area weeks before a full-fledged 
crisis spread mercilessly throughout the area. In the European case, it has already been reported that, 
despite the help provided in June to countries in difficulty, ―US money market funds have sharply cut 
their exposure to banks in the Eurozone over the past few weeks and reduced the available credit, even in 
stronger countries such as France.‖
16 
                                                           
15 Wolfang Munchau, ―The Eurozone crisis is on pause, not over,‖ Financial Times, July 24, 2011. 
16 Dan McCrum and Patrick Jenkins, ―US funds cut Eurozone exposure,‖ July 25, 2011, Financial Times. 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1cda4056-b495-11e0-a21d-00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz1TE85Jt5H 8 
 
  
 
Country  When  Amount  Result 
Mexico
17  December 1994  $50bn loan by US government  No Default 
Thailand
18  August 1997  $21bn loan by the IMF and other countries 
(1
st on August 11, for $17bn: Japan, Australian, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Indonesia, Korea, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank 
2
nd on August 20, for $3.9bn by the IMF) 
No Default 
Repaid loan in 2003, 4 years ahead 
of schedule 
Indonesia
19  August 1997  $23bn loan by the IMF and 
(IMF: $11.4bn 
The rest: Bank of Indonesia among others) 
No Default 
Repaid IMF in 2006 
South Korea
20  July 1997  $58.5 bn loan by the G7 governments, the IMF,  
the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank 
(IMF: $21bn Dec 1997) 
No Default 
By first quarter of 1999, the crisis 
was considered to be over 
(August 2001 repayment to IMF) 
Malaysia
21  September 1998  IMF help was refused  No Default 
By 1999 economic growth was back 
mainly due to the international 
capital flow that came back to East 
Asia in the forth quarter of 1998
22 
Russia  July 1998  $25bn loan by IMF and WB 
(IMF: $23bn on  July 13, 1998
23) 
Selective Default 
August 19, 1998 Russia fails to pay 
its debt on GKO and defaults. IMF 
and G7 declare will not provide 
more funds to Russia 
Brazil  1999  $41.5bn loan by IMF, World Bank, and G7 Nations 
$18bn loan by the IMF
24 and other international aid agencies will chip in $9 billion. The 
remaining $14.5 billion will come from industrial countries in North America, Europe 
and Asia. The United States will contribute $5 billion
25 
No Default 
Paid off its loans earlier on 
December 2005 
                                                           
17 Charles Calomiris, ―Lessons from the Tequila Crisis for Successful Financial Liberalization,‖ American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, October 1, 1999. 
http://www.aei.org/article/15090 
18 International Monetary Fund, ―IMF Approves Stand-by Credit for Thailand,‖ Press Release Number 97/37, August 20, 1997. 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1997/pr9737.htm 
19 International Monetary Fund, “Camdessus Commends Indonesian Actions,” Press Release Number 97/22, October 31, 1997.  
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/1997/nb9722.htm 
20 Jahyeong Koo and Sherry L. Kiser, ―Recovery from a financial crisis: the case of South Korea,‖ Federal Reserve of Dallas. 
http://www.dallasfed.org/research/efr/2001/efr0104c.pdf 
21 The Economist, ―A prickly pair,‖ A survey of South-East Asia, February 10, 2010. http://www.economist.com/node/280660 
22 Mahani Zainal Abidin, ―The Financial Crisis in Malaysia: The Economic and Political Consequences,‖ Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, October 1999. 
http://www.iseas.edu.sg/trends996.pdf 
23 International Monetary Fund, “Camdessus says IMF Board to Consider Strengthened Reform Program Supported by Substantial Increase in Financing for Russia,” 
Press Release Number 98/24.  http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/1998/nb9824.htm 9 
 
Argentina  2002  Refused IMF help and defaulted on part of external debt: $93bn (biggest default in 
history) 
Voluntary Default 
March 2005: President Kirchner 
declares the restructuring of the 
country's debt to be a success. 
Argentina offered to exchange more 
than $100bn in defaulted bonds
26  
Trying to pay back bondholders 
particularly Paris Club
27 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
24 International Monetary Fund, “IMF Approves SDR 13 Billion Stand-By Credit for Brazil; Activates NAB,” Press Release Number 98/59, December 2, 1998. 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1998/pr9859.htm 
25 Associate Press, ―$41.5 billion deal for Brazil to halt financial maelstrom, ― Deseret News, November 14, 1998. http://www.deseretnews.com/article/662853/415-billion-
deal-for-Brazil-to-halt-financial-maelstrom.html 
26 BBC News, ―Time line: Argentina,‖ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country_profiles/1196005.stm 
27 Jude Webber, ―Argentina and Paris Club: still at odds,‖ Financial Times, March 1, 2011. http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2011/03/01/argentina-and-paris-club-still-
wrangling/#axzz1TEppIAA8  
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The lesson learned from this long list of countries in disarray has been that in a globalized world, no 
matter how small a country is, it may have a devastating effect on the rest of the world. However, the EU 
and the Eurozone are facing another challenge. It is agreed that Greece must be saved, but voices are 
claiming that saving Greece should not cause the bankruptcy of other countries.   
Greece must be saved in order to stop contagion.  There are other countries in the area under 
stress, such as Portugal and Ireland, but these countries are suffering their own set of problems that are 
not attributable to Greece. However, when the risks of all these countries in difficulties are put together, 
the world faces Armageddon.  
As for the Greek problem, according to the information available, 60% of the debt is held by 
European countries, 29% by Greece, 3% in the hands of Asian countries, 3% in the USA and 5% in other 
various countries.
28 Therefore, the problem is mainly European, since almost 90% is held in the EU; thus, 
the Greek problem alone   has little effect at the international level. Also, the Bank of Internation al 
Settlement (BIS) has presented that 43% of the debt is in the hands of banks; in particular, the BIS also 
provides information on the breakdown of bank exposure to Greece’s debt. In fact, the information shows 
that Germany has about €80bn, France has an exposure of about €100bn, and the US has a bit less than 
€50bn involved.
29 Finally, it is important to explain that there are two groups of creditors in Greece: the 
official lenders, which consist of the IMF and the EU, and the private sector. 
As mentioned, Portugal and Ireland are facing their own sets of problems and are also under the 
watch and supervision of the IMF and the EU. Also, it is important to mention that this second bailout 
plan for Greece has helped relax the general terms and conditions for Greece, Ireland and Portugal. For 
instance, under the new contract, the interest on the repay loans for these countries has now been set at 
3.5%, rather than the 7% required before, and the repayment schedule has been extended from 7.5 years 
to a range that varies between 15 to 30 years.
30 
 
WHO IS RECEIVING MONEY 
Country  How much  When 
1
st Lending Facility for Greece 
1
st emergency tranche 
3
rd tranche  
€110bn 
€30bn 
€12bn ($17.4) 
May 2010 
May 19, 2011 
July 16, 2011 
2
nd Rescue plan for Greece  €102bn  July 21, 2011 
1
st Rescue plan for Ireland  €85bn  November 2010 
1
st Rescue plan for Portugal  €78bn  April 2011 
AMOUNT LOANED  €375bn  From May 2010 to July 
2011 
 
 
Saving Greece and Saving Europe: The EFSF and the European Central Bank 
 
The Greek problem has demonstrated that the EU and the Eurozone were not ready for member state 
default. The idea was that since member states had to respect the Stability and Growth Pact, there was 
little chance that countries would pile up deficits and incur massive debt. However, this unlikely scenario 
became a crude reality in May 2010. European Union policy makers approved three lending facilities in 
early May for Eurozone member states out of fear that the Greek sovereign debt crisis might spread to 
other countries. To stop contagion and to help Greece and other countries, it was necessary to deal with 
the ―no bail-out rule.‖ Thus, the problem was not the risk of default, but how to treat this threat of default 
                                                           
28 Boris Groendahl, ―German Banks Top French on $23 Billion Greek Debt, BIS Says,‖ Bloomberg, June 6, 2011. 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-06-06/german-banks-top-french-on-23-billion-greek-debt-bis-says.html 
29 Boris Groendahl, ―German Banks Top French on $23 Billion Greek Debt, BIS Says,‖ Bloomberg, June 6, 2011. 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-06-06/german-banks-top-french-on-23-billion-greek-debt-bis-says.html 
30 Peter Spiegel and Quentin Peel, ―Deal on Greece bail-out,‖ Financial Times, July 22, 2011.  
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and deal with Article 125.  Article 125
31  (ex Article 103 TEC) states that neither the EU nor a member 
state should be liable or assume the commitment of any public body or entity of any member state. This 
article directly bans any direct fiscal transfers from one member state to another and also seems to ban 
purchases of sovereign debt in the primary market. On May 11, 2010 the Council of the European Union 
approved  the  Council  Regulation  (EU)  No  407/2010 ,  which  established  the  European  financial 
stabilization mechanism; the No-Bail out rule of Article 125 was bypassed using Article 122(2) of the 
Treaty.  This article foresees the possibility of granting Union financial assistance to a Member State in 
difficulties or seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by exceptional occurrences beyond its 
control.‖
32 
On  May  9,  2010,  the  EU's  finance  ministers  adopted  a  regulation  establishing  a  European 
Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM) with the purpose of saving Greece and the union project, 
and which will help member states in difficulties caused by exceptional circumstances beyond their 
control to obtain financial assistance from the mechanism. The EFSM has a maximum total lending 
capacity of €60bn from the EU budget and administered by the European Commission.  Furthermore, 
Eurozone  member  states  agreed  to  create  the  European  Financial  Stability  Facility  (EFSF).  The 
European  Financial  Stability  Facility  (EFSF)  was  a special  purpose  vehicle set  up to  make  loans  to 
Eurozone member states other than Greece. The EFSF has been the third lending facility established to 
help countries in difficulty. The EFSF has been endowed with up to €440bn, which can be supplemented 
with €250bn from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The EFSF has the capacity to issue ―bonds 
guaranteed by EAMS for up to €440 billion for on-lending to euro area member states (EAMS) 
in difficulty, subject to conditions negotiated with the European Commission, and in liaison with 
the  European  Central  Bank  and  International  Monetary  Fund,  and  to  be  approved  by  the 
Eurogroup.‖
33  The  facility  has  been  granted  the  highest  possible  rating  by  the  three  rating 
agencies.    The  EFSF  ―is  a  Luxembourg-registered  company  owned  by  Euro  Area  Member 
States. It is headed by Klaus Regling, former Director-General for economic and financial affairs 
at the European Commission.‖
34  Troubled member states will receive funds after submitting a request 
comprising ―an assessment of its financial needs and an  economic and financial adjustment program 
describing the various measures to be taken to restore financial stability.‖
35  In fact, ―in order to reach its 
objective the EFSF can, with the support of the German Debt Management Office (DMO), issue bonds or 
other debt instruments on the market to raise the funds needed to provide loans to countries in financial 
difficulties. Issues would be backed by guarantees given by the 16 euro area Member States of up to € 
440 billion.‖
36   
 
Structure to Save the Project  Amount 
EFSM or Second Lending Facility 
EFSF or Third Lending Facility 
International Monetary Fund  
€60bn 
€440bn 
€250bn 
 
This leads to the next question: Where is this money coming from? The top two contributors who will be 
required to put the money on the table to save countries are Germany, who contributes with €119,390.07 
                                                           
31  Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,‖ Official Journal of the European Union, 
March 30, 2010 
32 Official Journal of the European Union, ―Regulations,‖ May 11, 2011. 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:118:0001:0001:EN:PDF 
33 European Financial Stability Facility, ―What about the EFSF.‖ http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/index.htm 
34 European Financial Stability Facility, ―What about the EFSF.‖ http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/index.htm 
35 European Commission Economic and Financial Affairs, ―European financial stabilisation mechanism.‖ 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/efsm/index_en.htm 
36 European Financial Stability Facility, http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/faq_en.pdf  
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million, followed by France, with €89,657.45 million.  The table
37 below shows the contribution of a 
number of countries. While Germany and France contribute almost half of the money ―chipped in,‖ PIIGS 
countries are also putting in an important share. This might be a way to discourage them from running 
into financial trouble, since the money they will receive will be their own. This brings up an interesting 
philosophical paradigm: how would a country in financial difficulty be able to receive money when this 
money would have to be technically provided by the country itself? 
  
Countries  Amount in million of €  Percent of total 
Germany  119,390.07  27% 
France  89,657.45  20% 
PIIGS 
Portugal 
Ireland 
Italy 
Greece 
Spain 
161,562.71 
11,035.38 
7,002.40 
78,784.72 
12,387.70 
52,352.51 
36% 
2004 countries  7,705.99  1.7% 
Rest of Eurozone  53,778.58  12% 
 
So far the EFSF has been quite active in its short lifespan, issuing bonds for Ireland and Portugal, as 
presented in the table below. 
 
European Commission placement on behalf of the EU under the EFSM 
Country  Issued  Terms 
Ireland  January 5, 2011  €5bn for 5 years with 2.500% annual coupon – 1
st tranche 
Ireland  March 17, 2011  €3.4bn for 8 years with 3.2500% annual coupon 
Ireland  May 24, 2011  €3bn for 10 years with a 3.500% annual coupon 
Portugal  May 24, 2011  €1.75bn for 10 years with a 3.5% annual coupon 
Portugal  May 25, 2011  €4.75bn for 5 year with 2.75% annual coupon 
Two further benchmark bonds are planned for the later second half of 2011 
 
Finally, after a lengthy and difficult negotiation between Germany and the rest of the Eurozone member 
states, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) will become a permanent crisis mechanism in mid-2013.  
The ESM will substitute the EFSF, which will be active until mid-2013. The main feature is that the ESM 
will expand the capabilities of the EFSF as it will reinforce economic surveillance in the EU.  The ESM 
will be asked to pay attention to debt sustainability, to have a more effective ap proach when enforcing 
measures and to focus on prevention to reduce the probability of another crisis in the future.  The legal 
basis  for  the  ESM  is  based  on  a  Council  Decision  adopted  under  Article  122,  which  requires  the 
Parliament to be informed, a "qualified majority" at the Council and an intergovernmental agreement. 
38  
The EFSF has not been working alone in order to calm the markets and stabilize the system. The 
European Central Bank (ECB) has also been quite active buying bonds from the affected countries. Still, 
the combined efforts of the EFSF and th e ECB are not enough. Even worse , neither investors nor the 
markets believe that the EFSF or the ESM starting in Mid -2013 will have enough funds to shore up the 
expected needs of countries in difficulties. It is important to mention that Greece, Portugal and Ireland are 
currently being helped, but Spain and Italy are expected to run into financial difficulties soon. Thus, the 
provisions of €440bn and the possible actions of the ECB would not be enough.  Countries in difficulties 
are also helped by the European Central Bank (ECB) which is buying Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Irish 
and Spanish bonds. In order to stop contagion and in light of financial difficulties, the ECB has already 
bought €77bn of Greek, Portuguese and Irish debt, and it is expected to step into the market to purchase 
                                                           
37 European Financial Stability Facility, ―Section A – EFSF general questions.‖     
http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/faq_en.pdf 
38 Europa, ―The European Stabilization Mechanism,‖ Press release, May 10, 2010. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/173  
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Italian and Spanish bonds for an estimated one trillion euros in the near future. The EFSF has already 
committed about €256 billion out of the €440bn available to help Greece, Portugal and Ireland.  Finally, 
both the ECB and the EFSF might have to step in to support Italy with €1.8 trillion in debt, which is more 
that the PIIGS countries combined.
39  
The ECB buying activity is similar to the actions of the Federal Reserve. However, the US enjoys 
a fiscal unity and, as a result,  the Fed mandate is strengthened, while the EU does not have this unity; 
thus, the ECB mandate is more limited. In fact, fiscal union is an  integration step forward that Germany 
has opposed since the founding of the single currency. But it is not fair to blame Germany alone for this 
lack of interest on fiscal unity. Germany opposes it for two simple  reasons. The introduction of a euro 
bond will, on the one hand, raise German funding costs significantly; on the other hand, if the fiscal union 
does not work out, Germans will have to pay for it. However, most countries would oppose a fiscal 
federation because it will force euro politicians to give up control over their national budgets. However, 
no currency union has ever survived without a fiscal union or some form of debt mutualization; in fact , 
the question of a euro bond or fiscal union is gaining recognition as the only way to stabilize the euro area 
and save the European Union.   
The ECB has done a superb job so far controlling the crisis and contagion , but the situation has 
become too serious and costly for the ECB alone without a fiscal union to stamp out the crisis. The ECB 
cannot step in the market forever to buy bonds and the EFSF funds are not enough, as it is expected that 
the amount needed to save countries in difficulties would be about a two trillion euros.  As a consequence, 
the market is unstable and the future of the union and the euro is seriously under review.  
    
The European Banking System: The Stress Tests of Europe 
 
Despite efforts to control the financial crisis, the EU has entered the second summer of ―Greek Tragedy‖ 
and the situation is not improving. Each day brings news of financial calamity; however, the EU and the 
Eurozone have a distracting factor: a strong euro/dollar rate. Since the euro is strong, some believe that 
the union project is safe, but the EU and the Eurozone are facing more problems than just the difficulties 
of five countries on the brink of bankruptcy; the solvency of the entire union is at risk.   
To add insult to injury, on July 16, 2011, Europe presented to the world the result of the ―stress 
test‖ on the strength of the banking system. The purpose of these tests is to measure the resistance of 
European banks during economic instability.  The idea for this test was inspired by the US banking crisis 
and, particularly, due to the difficult situation of Greece. The purpose of this type of test is to study and 
report publicly on the ―health‖ situation of the European banking system to calm the markets and reassure 
investors  that  the  European  banking  system  is  solid.  The  institution  in  charge  of  this  task  is  the 
Committee of European Bank Supervisors (CEBS), whose mission is to create scenarios, analyze the 
exposure and make projections.  
To date there have been three stress tests. The first one took place in September 2009 when the 
CEBS ran a very limited stress test on 22 banks that went almost unnoticed because the results were not 
made public.  The second stress test took place on July 23, 2010, pressured by the events that unfolded in 
Greece and the exposure of European banks to a possible Greek default. This time 90 banks were tested. 
The third stress test was carried out this summer and published on July 16, 2011.  In total, the list of 
banks stressed represents an approximate 65% of the European banking sector and 50% of the sector in 
each country analyzed.
40  
Currently, the EU and the Eurozone are suffering not only a difficult economic situation, but also 
the scrutiny of one of the most important pillars: the banking system. Due to the financial crisis that 
engulfed the world in 2007, and which   is still  being  felt, banks are now forced more than ever  to 
                                                           
39 Andrew Davis and James Hertling, ―ECB buying may reach $1.2 trillion in creeping fiscal union‖, Bloomberg August 9, 
2011.  
40 Megan Murphy, ―Analysts poring over southern Europe,‖ Financial Times, July 16/July 17, 2011. 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2be6b7e0-af05-11e0-bb89-00144feabdc0.html  
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implement the rules of Basel III. The purpose is to make sure that banks are ready to face a financial crisis 
and to measure the exposure of the banking system to the Greek problem.  Basel III has helped estimate 
that the exposure of the banks tested to Greece’s financial difficulties is €98.2bn ($138bn) which is €10bn 
less than the exposure during the second stress test in July 2010.
41 That is, if Greece goes under, European 
banks will lose $138bn with the subsequent impact at the economic and social level. 
In short, Basel I was the result of a number of deliberations and agreements that took place 
among central bankers from around the world who met in Basel (Switzerland) in 1988 to set the minimal 
capital requirements needed for the proper functioning of banks to reduce credit risk.  This agreement, the 
1988 Basel Accord, had to be enforced by 1992. Basel II expanded the requirements and guidelines of 
Basel I and had what was called three ―pillars‖: minimum capital requirement, supervisory review and 
market  discipline.  Guidelines  in  Basel  II  were  the  norm  in  2004,  and  the  purpose  was  to  create  an 
international standard that banking regulators could set as benchmarks when creating rules about how 
much capital banks must keep in reserve to face any possible financial and operational risk inherent to the 
bank. Basel III was triggered by the need to put together a better banking system after the financial crisis 
of 2007 and would apply to more than 8,000 banks in the EU. It has been defined by the Bank of 
International Settlements as ―a comprehensive set of reform measures, developed by the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision to strengthen the regulation, supervision and risk management of the banking 
sector‖ and it is based on the need to improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from 
economic and financial stress, improve risk management and governance, and strengthen the transparency 
and disclosure of banks.   
The EU has become the first area where these ―rules‖ have become law and the so-called Capital 
Requirement Directive 4, which forced large banks to have bigger and better levels of capital ready in 
order to face a crisis, is causing many problems in the banking industry. First, the common equity tier one 
(CET1) is increasing from 2% to 4% of risk-weighted assets, but the problem is that there are 14 strict 
criteria to  determine  what  can  be  counted  as  CET1.  Second,  Basel  III  forces  banks  to  implement  a 
―Capital Conservation Buffer‖, which should account for 2.5% of risk weighted assets. Thus, there is a 
total capital requirement of 7% that must be taken into account. This extra reserve requirement poses two 
intertwined threats to the system. First, banks have to put more money ―away‖ to comply with this 
requirement which, in turn, will mean that there might be less money available for the banks to lend; this 
will reduce the liquidity available.  Second, if the EU is the only area or country to implement these 
requirements, the EU would be at a disadvantage with less capital available. Thus, the idea is that banks 
must hold more top-quality capital and easy to sell assets in order to face potential losses. These rules and 
requirements aimed at ensuring liquidity may go against banks’ global competitiveness and is the heated 
debate of Basel III. Basel II analyzed 90 European banks and concluded that those banks which failed the 
test will need €2.5bn in order to improve their capital to successfully face a difficult economic downturn. 
Altogether, banks in the EU must come up with €84bn of CET1capital by 2015 and €460bn by 2019, and 
reduce their risk and balance sheets substantially.
42    
Out of the 90 banks tested this summer for Basel III in the EU, sixteen barely passed and eight 
flunked the exam: five are Spanish, two are Greek, one is Austrian, and one is German. All banks test ed 
in the UK, France, Portugal  and Ireland passed.  Out of these failing banks, the Spanish banks , 
particularly  the  cajas  (saving  banks) ,  are  widely  viewed  as  undercapitalized  and  chock  full  of 
questionable loans made for political, rather than economic, reasons.
43 However, Governor of the Bank of 
Spain Miguel Angel Fernandez-Ordonez has defended that this failing grade is unjust, since he complains 
that these cajas do not need to raise new capital because the European Banking Authority (EBA) refused 
                                                           
41 Nikki Tait, ―EU leads pack on bank capital,‖ Financial Times, July 21, 2011. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3fb41c06-
b2e1-11e0-86b8-00144feabdc0.html 
42 Nikki Tait, ―EU leads pack on bank capital,‖ Financial Times, July 21, 2011. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3fb41c06-
b2e1-11e0-86b8-00144feabdc0.html 
43 Collin Barr,‖ Eight banks fail Europe’s stress test,‖ CNN Money, July 15, 2011. http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/tag/banks/  
 
15 
 
to count general provisions; that is, money that Spain requires to set aside for just such a crisis as the one 
envisioned in the stress tests.
44 
   
Final Words 
 
Summer 2011 has become the make or break moment for the EU. The efforts to save Greece and other 
economically troubled countries are not working. The EU and the euro are will not see stability in the 
near future for a few reasons. First, a solution to the current financial crisis is being worked out by 
politicians  representing  different  sovereign  countries.  These  politicians  are  therefore  defending  their 
national  interests  and/or  their  taxpayers’  money.    Second, the  third  lending  facility,  or  EFSF,  worth 
€440bn, is simply not enough. Unless it is agreed that this fund enjoys a safety net of about a couple of 
trillion euros to rescue countries in difficulties, the markets are not going to calm down. Also, there 
should be a fiscal union and a European bond, which is an option that is not accepted by some EU 
member  states  for  political  reasons.  Finally,  politicians  should  understand  that  the  entire  burden  of 
helping should not be dumped on the European Central Bank, since there is no fiscal unity in the area. 
The EUC is not the Federal Reserve. Until these points do not become a reality, the EU, the euro, and the 
rest of the world are going to be suffering from constant instability, and even possible disintegration of 
the Eurozone. 
Current economic events demonstrate that the world financial system is under review. Years of 
uncontrolled excess are a thing of the past, and the rules of the game have changed for good or bad. 
Developed countries are now challenged by developing countries; thus, governments must restructure and 
individuals must review their lifestyles.  
The EU and the Eurozone both have a big task ahead: the continuation of the European Union as 
a viable project. Mistakes have been made, and they are either solved or the union is left on its own to 
self-destruct, although it seems that overcoming mistakes might cause self-destruction as well. 
  I strongly believe that the project has been given a second chance. However, it will depend on 
how politicians in the EU approach the situation.  The EU and the Eurozone may either become stronger 
or disappear after billions of euros have been ―wasted‖ in the cause, and the social fiber of the countries 
suffer an unfair ―punishment.‖  
 
 
                                                           
44 ―El Banco de Espana critica la metodología  europeas de las pruebas de resistencia‖, El Boletin, July 15, 2011. 
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